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Abstract 
In this article I explore relationships between love and politics by looking into Rosa 
Luxemburg’s letters to her lover and comrade Leo Jogiches. My discussion is framed 
within Hannah Arendt’s conceptualization of love as a manifestation of existence 
through the Augustinian journey of memory and as an existential force binding 
together the three faculties of the mind in her philosophical analysis: thinking, willing 
and judging. What I argue is that letters are crucial in enacting plurality and com- 
munication, and that Luxemburg’s letters to her lover and comrade intensify rather 
than obscure the force of the political in opening up radical futures. 
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‘No, I can’t work any more. I can’t stop thinking of you. I must write to 
you’ (Luxemburg to Jogiches, 16 July 1897, in Ettinger, 1979: 22). This is 
the opening phrase of a love letter that starts agonistically: the urge to 
write to the beloved is posited as a dire need. The thought of the lover is 
juxtaposed to the imperative of work, but the latter, important as it is, 
seems to recede. After all, the letter writer is Rosa Luxemburg, a revo- 
lutionist, a Marxist, a leading figure of the socialist movement of her 
times, but also a woman in love. Luxemburg has been a controversial 
figure for many reasons and on many grounds.1 But for many of us who 
came of age in the wake of the European social movements of the 1970s, 
Luxemburg  was  mostly  an  inspiring  figure,  a  living  example  of  the 
	  
	  
	  strength of politics not just in changing the world but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, in revolutionizing the ways we lived and the ways we 
loved. 
But given its multifarious meanings, configurations and expressions, 
how can love be conceptualized in relation to politics?2 This is the ques- 
tion that I want to explore in this article by reading Luxemburg’s letters 
to her lover and comrade Leo Jogiches within the framework of Hannah 
Arendt’s (1996) thesis on love. The article unfolds in four parts: first 
I chart lines of the Luxemburg/Arendt encounter and contextualize 
Luxemburg’s letters and her relationship with Jogiches within the 
socio-political  and  cultural  milieu  of  her  era;  in  the  second  section 
I explicate and discuss the concept of love in Arendt’s work as a mani- 
festation of existence through the Augustinian journey of memory; third, 
I explore themes emerging from an analysis of Luxemburg’s letters within 
an Arendtian framework, particularly focusing on the crucial role of 
epistolary narratives in enacting plurality and communication; finally, 
I revisit my initial proposition of making connections between love, 
memory and politics. What I suggest is that Luxemburg’s letters bring 
the abstract question of the relationship between politics and love to life. 
Moreover, they create a particularly interesting epistolary archive, 
wherein a cluster of Arendtian ideas and propositions around the polit- 
ical and the human condition can be fleshed out and rethought in the 
light of her reconfiguration of the Augustinian notion of love. There is a 
need, I think, for more work in this area of Arendtian scholarship, given 
that the publication of her doctoral dissertation in English (Arendt, 1996) 
has opened up new and contested grounds for her overall work to be 
contextualized and reconsidered. 
Read through Arendtian lenses, Luxemburg’s letters throw new light 
on a grey area: intense interactions between love as force, and the polit- 
ical as a space of communication and action. Their reading actually 
exposes some of the tensions in Arendt’s political thought, emerging, 
as Benhabib (1994: 111) has aptly pointed out, between ‘two formative 
forces of her spiritual-political identity, German Existenzphilosophie of 
the late 1920s and her political experiences as a Jewish German intellec- 
tual’. As a new comprehensive collection of Luxemburg’s letters has only 
recently been published (Adler et al., 2011), their rereading can oﬀer new 
insights into Luxemburg’s and indeed Arendt’s agonistic politics. While 
reviewing this volume, and anticipating the publication of the 14 volumes 
of Luxemburg’s corpus in English, Rose (2011: 5) has suggested that ‘the 
moment has clearly come for a return to Rosa Luxemburg’. But what 
does it mean to return, particularly when there are no clear paths or 
grounds to do so? Given the layers of distortion that have accumulated 
around her life and work, a return to Luxemburg should be taken as a 
genealogical  descent  (Foucault,  1986),  a  backwards  move  revealing 
	  	  
numberless beginnings, discontinuities and ruptures, as well as surprising 
continuities. 
As a matter of fact, Arendt was pivotal in returning to Luxemburg by 
choosing her as a woman whose life, in the form of a story, illuminated 
‘dark times’ more eﬀectively than theories and concepts could have done 
(Arendt, 1968: ix). As Kristeva (2001: 41) has noted, in reflecting upon 
and theorizing the narrated life, Arendt ‘gave new life to the praxis of 
narrative, [forging] together the destinies of life, the narrative and pol- 
itics’. But what were ‘the dark times’ that Luxemburg’s life was illumi- 
nating? In writing the essay on Luxemburg, initially as a review (Arendt, 
1966) of Nettl’s (1966) biography, Arendt was endorsing the author’s 
insightful decision to write the life story of ‘the most controversial and 
least understood figure in the German Left movement’ (Arendt, 1968: 
34). It was therefore dark times in the history of European socialism, 
linked to the consequent rise of totalitarian regimes that Luxemburg’s life 
was illuminating for Arendt. Indeed her essay is a thoughtful political 
analysis not only of the European political scene in the first decades of 
the 20th century, but also a critical genealogy of the European Left. 
Arendt was ‘returning to Luxemburg’ in the wake of the ruins of the 
European Left, but it is the political eﬀects of these ruins that we still 
experience and seek to understand. 
Rose’s (2011) celebration of the much anticipated publication of 
Luxemburg’s corpus in English bitterly reminds us that it was Lenin in 
1922 who first asked for a complete edition of her work, soon after Levi 
had published her essay on the Russian revolution.3 There is a gap of 
almost a century since Luxemburg’s murder, during which Lenin’s suc- 
cessors tried hard, albeit unsuccessfully, to erase Luxemburg from the 
map of socialist thought. And yet, Luxemburg keeps returning every time 
there is a flicker of hope, a ‘New Left’, Arendt has noted (1968: 37), 
fascinated by Luxemburg’s ideas around political action and the revolu- 
tion, themes that were at the heart of her own interests and writings.4 It 
was through her involvement in the 1905 Russian revolution and her 
work with the revolutionary workers’ councils that Luxemburg learnt 
that ‘good organization does not precede action, but is the product of 
it’ and that ‘the organization of revolutionary action can and must be 
learnt in revolution itself’ (Nettl, cited in Arendt, 1968: 52). Here also lies 
the source of her disagreement with Lenin and her criticism of his tactics 
in the 1918 revolution: ‘she did not believe in a victory in which the 
people at large had no part and no voice’ (Nettl, cited in Arendt, 1968: 
53) and in a most clairvoyant way she ‘was far more afraid of a deformed 
revolution than an unsuccessful one’ (Nettl, cited in Arendt, 1968: 53). 
Given Luxemburg’s crucial influence on how we understand and make 
sense of politics and the revolution, it is no wonder then that Rose frames 
the return to Luxemburg in the wake of ‘the Arab spring’: ‘We live in 
revolutionary times’, she  writes, and ‘I cannot imagine now what it 
	  	  
	  
would have been like to be thinking about Rosa Luxemburg if the 
revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya had not taken place’ (Rose, 
2011: 5). Whether we agree or not with Rose’s celebration of ‘revolution- 
ary times’, the need for a return to Luxemburg certainly emerges as an 
Arendtian way of understanding – an attempt to ‘think what we are 
doing’ (Arendt, 1998: 5) within turbulent times – but it is also triggered 
by the publication of her letters, an event to which Rose’s essay responds 
in the first place. 
Arendt was indeed a fervent admirer of the poetry and lyricism of 
Luxemburg’s letters. It was the event of the publication of ‘two small 
volumes of her letters’ (Arendt, 1968: 36), she writes, that brought a 
radical  shift  in  the  ‘propaganda  image  of  bloodthirsty  Red  Rosa’ 
(Arendt, 1968: 36), although they also gave rise to a similarly problematic 
discourse, ‘the image of the bird watcher and lover of flowers, a woman 
whose guards said good-by to her with tears in their eyes when she left 
prison’ (Arendt, 1968: 36–7). Taking Luxemburg’s letters as significant 
aspects of her legacy, what Arendt pithily identifies here is the need to 
excavate and deconstruct diﬀerent layers of distortion around 
Luxemburg, so that her life can throw light on what it means to live 
passionately in revolutionary times. As Rose (2011: 9) has forcefully put 
it: ‘For Luxemburg, passion – like politics – was a question of freedom.’ 
Perhaps because freedom was at the heart of Arendt’s life-long inter- 
ests and work, she did develop passionate and visceral connections with 
Luxemburg. As Young-Bruehl (1982: 124) notes, Arendt was 11 years old 
‘when her mother took her to the Ko¨ nigsberg demonstrations in 
support of the Spartacists’.5 What she did not know at the time was  
that her future husband Heinrich Blu¨  cher – 20 years old at the time – 
was among the young Spartacists marching against the First World  
War in Berlin (Young-Bruehl, 1982: 125). Arendt had thus heard a  
lot of anecdotal stories about Luxemburg, not only through the social 
democratic circles that her mother was involved in (Arendt, 1968: 37), 
but also later in life from Blu¨  cher himself, who had read and admired 
Luxemburg’s political writings. It is not surprising then that in 
reviewing Nettl’s book Arendt (1968: 33) celebrates well-researched 
biographies as an ‘admirable genre 
of historiography’, but also oﬀers her own reading of Luxemburg’s life 
and her relationship with Jogiches. 
In criticizing Nettl’s biographical account as having missed the fact 
that Luxemburg was ‘so self-consciously a woman [and therefore] an 
outsider’ (Arendt, 1968: 44), Arendt was also writing about her own 
experience of being a woman, but also ‘an outsider’, a European 
Jewish intellectual, as well as a refugee and later a migrant and a stateless 
person for more than 20 years. When choosing Rahel Varnhagen as the 
subject of her secondary doctoral thesis6 or when writing about 
Luxemburg, Arendt was  drawing  on  the  life  stories  of  two  women 
to  problematize  the  condition  of  Jewish  identity  on  two  levels:  ‘the 
	  	  
self-deception of assimilated Jews [. . .] that they were just as German as 
the Germans, just as French as the French [and] the self-deception of the 
intellectual Jews, that they had no ‘‘fatherland’’, for their fatherland 
actually was Europe’ (Arendt, 1968: 42). While Varnhagen was for 
Arendt an exemplary case of the first misconception, Luxemburg was 
under the spell of the second, hence her ‘utopian internationalism’ 
(Arendt, 1968: 43) as well as the consequent ‘inability to gauge correctly 
the enormous force of nationalist feeling in a decaying body-politic’ 
(Arendt, 1968: 43). 
Her criticism notwithstanding, Arendt had direct experiences of both 
levels of ‘self-deception’ and had tried to understand them through her 
analysis of the condition of ‘the outsider’ or ‘the pariah’ in her secondary 
thesis, as well as in a number of essays (see Arendt, 1978). As Benhabib 
(1994: 90) has noted, in writing Varnhagen’s life, Arendt was tracing an 
existential transition, ‘a move away from the psychology of the parvenu 
to that of the pariah’. In discussing Arendt’s figure of the ‘conscious 
pariah’ (Arendt, 1978: 76), as inhabiting ‘a privileged site from which 
one can secure the distance necessary for independent critique, action 
and judgement’, Honig (1992: 231) has referred to Luxemburg as a ‘con- 
scious pariah’ par excellence for Arendt. 
Luxemburg’s condition as ‘a conscious pariah’ in Arendt’s analysis is 
closely intertwined with her relationship to Jogiches and is contextualized 
within the ethics, practices and politics of the ‘Polish-Jewish ‘‘peer- 
group’’ [which] consisted of assimilated Jews from middle-class families, 
whose cultural background was German, their political formation 
Russian and their moral standards in both private and public life their 
own’ (Arendt, 1978: 40). Following Nettl’s lead in having identified the 
importance of this group, Arendt highlights its role in forging relational 
ties among its members that were drawing on common ‘moral taste’ 
(Arendt, 1978: 40), disregarding diﬀerences of political opinions, social, 
ethnic and even religious positions, ‘in a world that was not out of joint’ 
(Arendt, 1978: 41). But in rewriting Jogiches’ role in Luxemburg’s life, 
within the condition of ‘the conscious pariah’ and the socio-political 
context of the Polish-Jewish peer group, Arendt was also pointing to 
the need to perceive love as a passionate force of life, entangled within 
the web of human relations, which are always contingent and 
unpredictable: 
	  
Their deadly serious quarrel, caused by Jogiches’ brief aﬀair with 
another woman and endlessly complicated by Rosa’s furious reac- 
tion, was typical of their time and milieu, as was the aftermath, his 
jealousy and her refusal for years to forgive him. This generation 
still believed firmly that love strikes only once, and its carelessness 
with marriage certificates should not be mistaken for any belief in 
free love. (Arendt, 1968: 45) 
	  	  
As Young-Bruehl (1982: 239) has commented, it was her mother’s gen- 
eration that Arendt had in mind when writing about Luxemburg, but her 
essay is also coloured by her own intellectual and emotional relation- 
ships.7 It has to be noted, however, that the issues around faithfulness 
and jealousy that Arendt discusses above, have to be placed outside the 
constraints of bourgeois morality and conventions. Such questions need 
to be reframed within the psychosocial context of a revolutionary woman 
like Luxemburg or a Weimar Berliner like Arendt, who were interested 
not in ‘loyal love’ but in ‘loyalty to love’ (Young-Bruehl, 1982: 39). 
It is therefore alternative loyalties to love and to the revolution that 
Luxemburg’s letters express: in an Arendtian mode they disclose the 
uniqueness of ‘who’ Luxemburg is at the same time that they allow her 
to emerge in the web of human relations of which she is part. 
Luxemburg’s letters thus become signs of uniqueness as well as traces 
of plurality, an essential condition of all political life in Arendt’s thought 
(Arendt, 1998: 7). Through the narrative force of her letters, Luxemburg 
appears to the world as a woman whose passion and love for the world is 
inextricably interwoven with her political activities. As Rose (2011: 8) has 
insightfully put it, her correspondence should not be read ‘as the sole 
repository of intimacy, but because it shows the ceaseless traﬃc between 
the personal and political’. In thus tracing the narrative force of 
Luxemburg’s letters, it is on their personal/political entanglements that 
I will now focus, by returning to the epistolary extract, whose opening 
phrase was cited at the beginning of this article. 
	  
No, I can’t work any more. I can’t stop thinking of you. I must 
write to you. Beloved, dearest, you’re not with me, yet my whole 
being is filled with you. It might seem irrational to you, even absurd, 
that I am writing this letter – we live only ten steps apart and meet 
three times a day – and anyway, I’m only your wife – why then the 
romanticism, writing in the middle of the night to my own husband? 
Oh, my golden heart let the whole world think me ridiculous, but 
not you. Read this letter seriously, with feeling, the same way you 
used to read my letters back in Geneva when I wasn’t your wife yet. 
I’m writing with the same love as then; my whole soul goes out to 
you as probably you are smiling – ‘after all, nowadays I cry for no 
reason at all!’ (in Ettinger, 1979: 22) 
Written from Switzerland on 16 July 1897, the letter above carries 
signs of tormented subjects within a turbulent era and starts with a dis- 
claimer of its necessity or rationality. In interrupting what is important in 
her life, quite simply her political work, the author seeks to understand 
why she feels the urge to write to the beloved, who is not even absent, 
neither  can  he  stand  as  a  ‘romantic’  figure  since  he  has  become  ‘a 
	  	  
husband’. It has to be noted here that Luxemburg and Jogiches never got 
married: the ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ positions are taken up in the epistolary 
discourse as a mode of denoting a long life partnership in love and pol- 
itics, some events and trails of which I will now trace. 
Luxemburg was 20 years old when she met Jogiches in Zurich in 1890 
and he was three years older than her. They had fled their birth countries 
and were heavily involved in socialist politics. There were strong links but 
also significant diﬀerences between them. Apart from being young, 
Jewish, exiled from their countries and working in the same political 
circles,8 they were also both studying at the University of Zurich between 
1890 and 1897. Luxemburg published her doctoral thesis, The Industrial 
Development of Poland, in 1898 (Luxemburg, 1977), but Jogiches never 
completed his own, despite Luxemburg’s fervent endeavours to persuade 
him to do so. As she was writing from Berlin on 26 January 1900: 
	  
it makes me happy that you applied yourself with such passion to 
your paper, or rather to your doctorate. Working on it you have 
realized how well you can write (both in general and in 
German) ..  . the doctorate will encourage you to try your hand at 
other kinds of work. (in Ettinger, 1979: 106) 
On top of being a tireless political activist, Luxemburg was an inspir- 
ing theorist and an eloquent writer; but she would always send her 
speeches, essays and books to Jogiches: ‘you don’t know that everything 
I do is with you in mind. Always when I write an article, my first thought 
is you’ll be thrilled by it’ (in Ettinger, 1979: 71), she wrote on 6 March 
1899 from Berlin. It has to be noted here of course that Luxemburg 
would also revolt against Jogiches’ paternalistic attitude: ‘You seem to 
be called upon to preach to me and to play the role of my mentor always, 
no matter what. Your current advice and criticism of my ‘‘activities’’ go 
far beyond a close friend’s comment – it’s just systematic moralizing’ (in 
Ettinger, 1979: 89), she was poignantly writing from Berlin on 13 January 
1900. 
Jogiches was not just a critical reader but also an excellent political 
organizer; coming from a wealthy family he was also a constant source of 
funding both for ‘the cause’ and the relationship.9 Although they stayed 
together for 15 years, Luxemburg and Jogiches only spent short times 
living together and even when they did, they never really cohabited, 
keeping diﬀerent, albeit neighbouring apartments, where they could 
avoid social criticism, but also work in peace.10 In this light, their letters, 
like all letters, were bridges between presence and absence, filling the gaps 
of a long-distance relationship, but also opening up channels of commu- 
nication that sustained their love and their political action in concert. 
‘During the Schippel campaign your letters stimulated my thinking day 
by  day’,  Luxemburg  was  writing  from  Berlin  on  6  March  1899 
	  (in Ettinger, 1979: 72). But since politics and love are intertwined in their 
lived and epistolary relationship, the strains and frustration of not living 
together also leave their signs in the text of the same letter: 
	  
I felt happiest about the part of your letter in which you wrote that 
we are both still young and able to arrange our personal life. Oh, 
Dyodyu, my golden one, if only you keep your promise! ..  . Our own 
small apartment, our own nice furniture, our own library; quiet and 
regular work, walks together, an opera from time to time, a small, 
very small,  circle of  friends who  can sometimes be  invited for 
dinner; every year a summer vacation in the country, one month 
with absolutely no work! ..  . And perhaps even a little, a very little 
baby? Will this never be allowed? Never? (in Ettinger, 1979: 73–4) 
There is a range of very interesting themes in the above letter, which 
I discuss in the third section of the article. What I want to highlight here 
is the forceful way that the epistolary extract above portrays a relation- 
ship bursting with tensions till its very end. But although Luxemburg and 
Jogiches broke up in 1907 their political relationship continued till the 
end   of   their   lives.   As   already   noted,   in   1914   they   established 
the  Spartacus  League,  wrote  articles  and  organized  activities  against 
the  war.  While  Luxemburg  was  in  prison,  between  1915  and  1918, 
Jogiches looked after her ‘and was constantly at her side’ (Ettinger, 
1982:  191).  After  the  crash  of  the  Spartacist  Rising  in  Berlin  and 
Luxemburg’s murder in January 1919, Jogiches ignored warnings and 
stayed on, determined to reveal the crime of the Freicorps forces; he 
was murdered three months later, in March 1919. Their murder ‘under 
the eyes and probably with the connivance of the Socialist regime then in 
power   [. . .]   by   a   paramilitary   organization   from   which   Hitler’s 
storm  troopers  were  soon  to  recruit  their  most  promising  killers’ 
(Arendt, 1968: 35), as well as the eradication of Luxemburg’s legacy by 
the Stalinist regime, marks one of the darkest moments in the history of 
the European Left, whose eﬀects we still need to unravel and understand. 
In reading Luxemburg’s letters to Jogiches, what we also need to 
imagine  is  their  addressee,  whose  letters  have  not  been  preserved. 
Jogiches is of course the absent presence par excellence of 
Luxemburg’s epistolary archive. How can one deal with the presence 
of  the  absent?  There  is  a  long  philosophical  inquiry  around  this 
Platonic theme that Ricoeur (2002) has considered and discussed in his 
influential theorization of memory and forgetting. As an external reader 
of these letters, Arendt has imagined Jogiches as ‘a man of action and 
passion [who] knew how to do and how to suﬀer’ (Arendt, 1968: 45). 
Rose has been less sympathetic: ‘there is no gender cliche´   that  
doesn’t spring to mind when thinking about Leo Jogiches’, she notes  
(Rose, 2011:  9).  But  although  Rose  makes  a  series  of  pertinent  
comments 
	  	  
about the Luxemburg–Jogiches relationship, I cannot agree with her idea 
that Jogiches ‘did not have an inner life’ (Rose, 2011: 9); maybe he did 
not or could not find ways to express his feelings, but in any case we 
cannot know. From the epistemological perspective of epistolarity, let- 
ters are bridges between presence and absence, but they can never stand 
for or represent this absence. Since the focus of this article is not on the 
letter writers’ ‘inner lives’, however, but on epistolary narratives as sites 
where love and politics become constitutive of each other, it is to the 
love–politics complex in Arendt’s thought that I now turn. 
	  
	  
Love, Memory, Politics 
Love was at the heart of Arendt’s theoretical interests: her doctoral thesis 
was on love in St Augustine, while, in writing Varnhagen’s life, she par- 
ticularly considered and discussed a Jewish woman’s failure in ‘matters of 
love’ (Arendt, 2000). Love is further extensively discussed in the chapter 
on ‘Action’ of The Human Condition, particularly in relation to forgive- 
ness. Love, ‘one of the rarest occurrences in human lives, indeed pos- 
sesses an unequalled power of self-revelation and an unequalled clarity of 
vision for the disclosure of who’, writes Arendt (1998: 242). Love is thus 
configured as an existential force through which human beings appear to 
each other and to the world. But while facilitating the emergence of the 
uniqueness of the who, love is not concerned with the worldly character, 
‘the whatness’ (Guaraldo, 2001: 27) of humans or things: ‘by reason of its 
passion, [love] destroys the in-between which relates us to and separates 
us from others’ (Arendt, 1998: 242). In short, love moves us away from 
the world, it is ‘unworldly [. . .] not only apolitical but antipolitical, per- 
haps the most antipolitical of all antipolitical human forces’ (Arendt, 
1998: 242). Arendt’s ambivalence in relation to the worldly character 
of love is thus stark in the above often-cited extracts of The Human 
Condition. 
Removed from the political, love still remains important in the 
thought of a political theorist; it actually becomes a conditio sine qua 
non for life, shaping as Kristeva (2001: 31) has noted, the themes and 
directions of her later work. But how can love, as ‘an antipolitical’ force 
par excellence, aﬀect the configuration of the political? Leaving aside 
personal grounds and ties in considering this riddle, I want to focus on 
love as an existential notion in Arendt’s political thought.11 Here I draw 
on the argument that ‘Arendt’s categories and methods of theorizing are 
not fully intelligible unless read against the background of German exist- 
entialism’ (Hinchman and Hinchman, 1994: 143), and particularly in 
relation to the influence of Jaspers, who was the supervisor of her doc- 
toral thesis on love. 
As Hinchman and Hinchman have further argued, Jaspers and Arendt 
attempted to bridge the gap between solitude and contemplation – so 
	  important for the ‘authentic individual’ of existentialist thought – and the 
worldliness of being, ‘whether through ‘‘communication’’ (Jaspers) or 
action in the political arena (Arendt)’ (Hinchman and Hinchman, 
1994: 143). In this context what I suggest is that love for Arendt is 
configured as a fort-da movement, through which the solitary individual 
flies away from the world, but then returns to it: an ‘antipolitical’ force 
that ultimately creates conditions of possibility for the constitution of the 
political. ‘This rebellious return, this desire for rupture, renewal or 
renaissance’, animates Arendt’s writings on the world revolutions, 
Kristeva (2001: 34) has noted. 
This configuration of love as a force of life and change is clearly not 
to be conflated with ‘the inherent wordlessness of love’ (Arendt, 1998: 
52). As Arendt poignantly points out, ‘love in distinction from friend- 
ship, is killed or rather extinguished, the moment it is displayed  in 
public’ (Arendt, 1998: 50), further adding that ‘love can only become 
false and perverted when it is used for political purposes such as the 
change or salvation of the world’ (Arendt, 1998: 52). Love is then a 
conditio sine qua non, but not the conditio per quam of the political: 
it can inspire revolutions  but it cannot be used to justify or ground 
them. But since it is Augustine’s notion of love that ‘paves the way for 
a conceptualization of life as mobility, alterity and alteration’ (Kristeva, 
2001: 34), it is to Arendt’s reconfiguration  of  the  concept  that  I 
now  turn. 
Arendt’s thesis ‘Love and St Augustine’ was defended in 1928, but 
while it was her first work to be published in  German  in  1929,  it 
would become her last book-length manuscript to be published in 
English, in 1996, 21 years after her death. There is a gap of almost 70 
years, which has greatly shaped the ways Arendtian notions have been 
read, operationalized, defended or disputed in political theory in general 
and its feminist strands in particular.12 My reading of Arendt’s notion of 
love and the connections I draw with the political is thus situated in a 
field of scholarship that has followed the publication of her Augustinian 
thesis (see, among others, Hammer, 2000; Kampowski, 2009; Kristeva, 
2001; Scott and Stark, 1996). It has to be noted, however, that this con- 
nection has become controversial; as Scott and Stark, the editors of this 
publication have noted, it ‘will continue to be so until the whole corpus 
of her work in Germany and America is evaluated and incorporated into 
the ‘‘orthodox’’ rendering of Arendt’s political thought’ (Scott and Stark, 
1996: viii) 
Controversies notwithstanding, Arendt had started working on  the 
thesis in 1960, with a publication in mind. As she was writing  to 
Jaspers in 1966: 
	  
I am doing something odd on the side [. . .] I am rewriting my 
Augustine in English [. . .] It’s strange – this work is so far in the 
	  	  
	  
past, on the one hand; but on the other, I can still recognize myself 
as it were; I know exactly what I wanted to say. (16 January 1966, in 
Arendt and Jaspers, 1993: 622) 
The publication was never realized during her lifetime, but as a range 
of Arendtian scholars have argued, her thesis on Augustine remained 
central in  the political writings of her maturity  (see  Scott  and 
Stark, 1996). 
Moreover, Augustine’s thought is critical in how Arendt (1981) devel- 
ops her section on ‘the faculty of the Will and by implication to the 
problem of Freedom’ in her posthumously published work The Life of 
the Mind, while the notion of love binds together the three faculties, 
namely Thinking, Willing and Judging. As Young-Bruehl has noted, 
we think since we love meaning and the search for truth, we will the 
pleasure that the continuation of things can oﬀer and we judge within 
the disinterested love that the image of the beautiful – conceived as such 
within the Kantian notion of the ‘enlarged mentality’ – can oﬀer us: ‘an 
image of judging as a disinterested love . . . put together with the image of 
thinking as an eros for meaning and the image of willing, transformed 
into love, willing objects to continue being’ (Young-Bruehl, 1982: 356, 
emphasis in the original). But this recurrence of love, as a concept bind- 
ing the three faculties of the mind and as a force of life re-inserting us into 
the world, derives from its emergence as an eﬀect of the Augustinian 
journey of memory, which I will discuss next. 
In the quest of meaning for ourselves and our relationship to the 
world, the future cannot oﬀer us any hope since it is directed to death, 
a certain point that defines the temporality of human existence, as influ- 
entially theorized by Heidegger (2003). In seeking fearlessness through 
love,13 Augustine’s philosophy oﬀers a diﬀerent image of time that comes 
from the future and is directed towards the past, the moment of the 
beginning of the world, as well as our  own  beginning,  namely  our 
birth. This image of time can be humanly conceptualized through 
memory: ‘Time exists only insofar as it can be measured, and the yard- 
stick by which we measure it is space’ (Arendt, 1996: 15). For Augustine 
then, memory is the space wherein we measure time, but what we can 
measure is only what remains fixed in memory from the ‘no more’ and 
what exists as expectation from the ‘not yet’. As Arendt (1996: 15) elo- 
quently puts it: ‘It is only by calling past and future into the presence of 
remembrance and expectation that time exists at all.’ Although timeless, 
the present does become ‘the only valid tense’, the Now ‘is not time but 
outside time’, Arendt (1996: 15) writes. 
Love is crucial in the experience of the timeless Now: while for 
Augustine it is the love for God that can make humans forget their 
temporal  existence  in  the  contemplation  of  eternity,  forgetfulness, 
	  	  
	  
Arendt (1996: 28) notes, ‘is by no means only characteristic of the love of 
God’. In loving: 
	  
[man] not only forgets himself, but in a way [he] ceases to be 
[himself], that is this particular place in time and space. [He] loses 
the human mode of existence, which is mortality, without exchang- 
ing for the divine mode of existence, which is eternity. (Arendt, 
1996: 28) 
But there is a problem in this self-forgetfulness and transcendence of 
human existence for Augustine: the Christian imperative to love thy 
neighbour. This is how the Augustinian journey of memory ‘as a two- 
step process of isolation from and return to this world’ (Hammer, 2000: 
87) becomes so important for Arendt: ‘the fact that the past is not forever 
lost and that remembrance can bring it back into the present is what gives 
memory its great power’.14 This Augustinian statement is what underpins 
and sustains Arendt’s departure from Heidegger’s orientation toward 
death, to the concept of natality that marks her own philosophy: 
	  
Since our expectations and desires are prompted by what we 
remember and guided by a previous knowledge, it is memory and 
not expectation (for instance the expectation of death as in 
Heidegger’s approach) that gives unity and wholeness to human 
existence. (Arendt, 1996: 56) 
Augustine’s existential question par excellence, ‘I have become a ques- 
tion to myself’,15 initiates a memory journey in which ‘the beginning and 
end of [his] life become exchangeable’ (Arendt, 1996: 57). In remember- 
ing the past and its joys we also transform them into future possibilities, 
while human existence appears as what it is: an ‘everlasting Becoming’ 
(Arendt, 1996: 63), in a world that is both physical and human. It is in the 
realization of existence in the human world that the neighbourly love 
emerges, since the human world ‘constitutes itself by habitation and love 
(diligere) [. . .] love for the world [. . .] rests on being of the world’ (Arendt, 
1996: 66). 
Indeed, amid the three configurations of love in Augustine’s philoso- 
phy, ‘love as craving (appetitus), love as a relation between man and God 
the Creator, and neighbourly love’ (Young-Bruehl, 1982: 74), it is the 
latter that fascinates Arendt. Neighbourly love as an existential concept 
is also crucial in her philosophical thought as influenced by Jaspers. As 
Young-Bruehl has pithily remarked: ‘Augustine’s three types of love are 
also examined with existential concepts crucial to the three dimensions of 
philosophizing Jaspers had formulated ..  . a world-oriented love (appe- 
titus), an existential love (neighbourly love) and a transcendent love 
(love of the Creator)’ (Young-Bruehl, 1982: 75). The significance of the 
	  	  
	  
neighbourly love in Arendt’s political thought is linked to the way she 
reconfigured the temporal structure of human existence in her disserta- 
tion: worldly love is future oriented, transcendent love is directed 
towards the ultimate past, while it is only neighbourly love that exists 
in the present, absorbing, as it were, ‘the other modes of temporal exist- 
ence and the capacities they presuppose ..  . hope and memory’ (Young- 
Bruehl, 1982: 76). 
By illuminating the present, the timeless space between the ‘no longer’ 
and the ‘not yet’, Arendt highlights natality as the defining aspect of 
human temporality and is concerned with politics as an arena where 
new beginnings are always possible, as history has so forcefully shown: 
‘the essence of all, and in particular of political action, is to make a new 
beginning’ (Arendt, 1994: 321). But these new beginnings are also closely 
interrelated with freedom as inherent in the human condition: 
	  
Man does not possess freedom so much as he, or better his coming 
into the world, is equated with the appearance of freedom in the 
universe [. . .] Because he is a beginning, man can begin; to be human 
and to be free are one and the same. (Arendt, 2006: 165–6) 
Thus, while the final destination of Augustine’s memory journey is 
God, Arendt’s chosen destination is humanity, the  remembrance  of 
what binds us together, namely our birth in the world, ‘for the sake of 
novitas’ (Arendt, 1996: 55) and therefore freedom. Having retreated from 
the world in the quest for meaning, we thus follow an Augustinian jour- 
ney of memory from the future into the past and, by reaching our birth as 
a common experience that binds us as humans, we reconcile ourselves 
with the world and through the experience of neighbourly love, ‘as an 
expression of interdependence’ (Arendt, 1996: 104), we reposition our- 
selves in-the-world-with-others.16 Love is then an existential concept in 
Arendt’s political thought that binds together the two crucial compo- 
nents of her philosophy, uniqueness and plurality: ‘existence can develop 
only in the shared life of human beings inhabiting a given world common 
to them all’, she writes (Arendt, 1994: 186). 
It was the image of ‘a given world common to all’ that Arendt was 
visualizing when she wrote Varnhagen’s life; in doing this she was able to 
flesh out the existential concept of love by drawing on stories inscribed in 
diaries and letters. Narratives are indeed at the heart of how Arendt 
conceptualizes the human condition. Drawing on the Aristotelian 
notion of energeia, Arendt’s thesis is that ‘action as narration and nar- 
ration as action are the only things that can partake in the most ‘‘spe- 
cifically human’’ aspects of life’ (Kristeva, 2001: 41). As the only tangible 
traces of human existence, stories in Arendt’s thought evade theoretical 
abstractions and contribute to the search of meaning by revealing mul- 
tiple perspectives while remaining open and attentive to the unexpected, 
	  	  
	  
the unthought-of; they ‘respect the contingency of action’ (Guaraldo, 
2001: 214) and express the unpredictability of the human condition. In 
doing so stories ultimately reconfigure the sphere of politics as an open 
plane of horizontal connections, wherein the revolution can once again 
be re-imagined. 
In this light, epistolary narratives constitute a discursive site for 
memory journeys to be initiated and for love to emerge as a force of 
life that makes the isolated individual ‘feel at home in the world’ through 
remembering, communicating and ultimately acting. As Disch (1994: 
172) has commented, ‘feeling at home in the world’ is a constant pre- 
occupation in Arendt’s political thought, since the crucial problem she 
identifies in The Human Condition is ‘world alienation and not self-alie- 
nation as Marx thought’ (Arendt, 1998: 254). For Arendt, then, our 
involvement in the web of human relations, and therefore in action, is 
the only way we can feel again ‘at home in this world’. In this light, it 
is the force of the epistolary form in acting through narration that brings 
the discussion back to Luxemburg’s letters. In doing this I now return to 
the last part of the birthday letter of 6 March 1899, already cited in the 
previous section. 
	  
	  
Dear Dyodyu: Epistolary Narratives of Love and Struggle 
. . . Dyodyu, if only you’d settle your citizenship, finish your doctor- 
ate, live with me openly in our own home. We will both work and 
our life will be perfect!! No couple on earth has the chance we have. 
With just a little goodwill we will be happy, we must. Weren’t we 
happy when just the two of us lived and worked together for long 
stretches of time? Remember Weggis? Melida? Bougy? Blonay? 
Remember when we are alone in harmony, we can do without the 
whole world? . . . Remember, last time in Weggis when I was writing 
‘Step by Step’ (I always think with pride about that little master- 
piece), I was sick writing in bed, all upset, and you were so gentle, so 
good, sweet [. . .] Or do you remember the afternoons at Melida, 
after lunch, when you sat on the porch, drinking black thick coﬀee, 
sweating in the scorching sun, and I trudged down to the garden 
with my ‘Administrative Theory’ notes. Or do you remember, how 
once a band of musicians came on a Sunday to the garden [. . .] and 
we went on foot to Maroggia and we came back on foot, and the 
moon was rising over San Salvadore, and we had just been talking 
about my going to Germany. We stopped, held each other on the 
road in the darkness and looked at the crescent moon over the 
mountains. Do you remember? I still smell the night’s air. Or, do 
you remember how you used to come back from Lugano at 8:20 at 
	  	  
	  
night, with the groceries [. . .] Oh, you know, we have probably 
never had such magnificent dinners as those, on the little table in 
that bare room, the door to the porch open, the fragrance of the 
garden sweeping in, and you, with great finesse, scrambling eggs in a 
pan. And from afar in the darkness the train to Milan was flying 
over the bridge, thundering [. . .] Oh Dyodyu, Dyodyu! Hurry up, 
come here; we’ll hide from the whole world; the two of us in two 
little rooms, we’ll work alone, cook alone, and we’ll have a good, 
such a good life! [. . .] Dyodyu dearest, I throw my arms around 
your neck and kiss you a thousand times. I want you. [. . .] I don’t 
want to write about business today – tomorrow, after seeing 
Kautsky [. . .] I hug you and kiss you on the mouth and on my 
belovedest nose and absolutely want you to carry me in your arms. 
	  
Yours, Ro´  z_ a (in Ettinger, 1979: 73–5) 
	  
Among the many things that strike me in reading Luxemburg’s poetic 
letter above is the recurrence of the ‘do you remember?’ question. 
Written on the day of her birthday,  the  narrative  reiteration  of  the 
need to remember becomes particularly significant in the light of 
Arendt’s existential concept of love and its link to memory, natality 
and politics as discussed in the previous section. It is by recalling past 
(and scarce) moments of living together with the beloved – who is also a 
comrade and a political mentor – that Luxemburg’s amorous discourse 
unfolds. What is also important is that memories of the crescent moon, 
the train passing by in the darkness, simple dinners in the Italian coun- 
tryside and worries about Kautsky’s reception of her work, the ordinary 
and the extraordinary, are crammed together in the body of this letter. 
In discussing the discourse of remembrance in amorous epistolary 
narratives, Kauﬀman (1986: 17) has noted that retrieving past moments 
of happiness in the text of the letter is an amorous epistolary practice that 
goes back to Ovid’s Heroids.17 But while the Ovidean heroine writes to 
the beloved recalling past moments of happiness – since writing is the 
only act that can revert the position of ‘the deserted woman’ – there is a 
significant inflection in Luxemburg’s epistolary practices: the memory of 
blissful moments goes hand in hand with the memory of political creation 
and action: the period when she was writing ‘the little masterpiece’ Step 
by Step or working with The Administrative Theory Notes. Luxemburg is 
not ‘a deserted woman’ – although sometimes she feels so as a result of 
Jogiches’ indiﬀerence – but a political actor, who wants to change the 
world, not just on the macro level but also in the minutiae of everyday 
life. In this light she actively seeks and claims the pleasure and right of 
being happy: ‘we will be happy, we must’, she notes emphatically in the 
birthday letter above. 
	  	  
	  
But for Luxemburg the often controversial and ambiguous image of ‘a 
happy life’18 is interwoven in the web of political relations in a mutual co- 
dependence. A ‘happy life’ for Luxemburg is about loving, studying, 
writing, acting; as a revolutionary she wants them all and she wants 
them in the Now that she reflects upon and wills to revolutionize and 
radically change. In tracing signs of the author’s expression of a forceful 
will, the external reader of these letters cannot but make connections with 
Arendt’s configuration of love as an existential force that binds together 
thinking, willing and judging in Luxemburg’s ‘life of the mind’. 
Luxemburg’s Now is Arendt’s timeless present, a site of struggle, but 
also a region par excellence for thinking and remembering: ‘The gap 
between past and future opens only in reflection [which] draws these 
absent ‘‘regions’’ into the mind’s presence; from that perspective the 
activity of thinking can be understood as a fight against time itself’ 
(Arendt, 1981: 206). 
Luxemburg needs these regions ‘to hide from the world’ in the com- 
pany of her lover, but this retreat is not ‘antipolitical’ in the way Arendt 
has discussed it in The Human Condition (Arendt, 1998: 242). This 
moving away from the world is only temporary, sheltering and nurturing 
the lovers and thus strengthening them for a return to the world, the 
political arena and the fight for the revolution. Far from being ‘apolitical’ 
or ‘antipolitical’, Luxemburg’s retreat opens up spaces in the margins; 
indeed, many of her letters are written in border situations – be they the 
author’s birthday, life in prison or critical political events.19 In Jaspers’ 
existential philosophy, border situations create conditions of possibility 
for existential appearances: ‘We become aware of Being by proceeding in 
thought from the ‘‘imagined world of the merely thinkable’’ to the border 
of reality, which as a pure object of thought or pure possibility can no 
longer be grasped’ (Arendt, 1994: 184). What is crucial in Jaspers’ 
thought for Arendt is the recognition that ‘being as such is not knowable’ 
(Arendt, 1994: 186). This acknowledgement creates ‘an island of human 
freedom [. . .] marked by the border situations in which [man] experiences 
the limitations that directly determine the conditions of [his] freedom and 
provide the basis for his actions’ (Arendt, 1994: 186). 
In this context, border situations illuminate existence and can orientate 
actions: communication is thus conceived as the milieu par excellence 
wherein existence is manifested and therefore realized. Luxemburg’s let- 
ters, I argue, carry traces of thought within border situations of existential 
appearance and thus open up possibilities of communication about pol- 
itics, the revolution and the lovers’ life, in a future that is radical and 
open. Indeed, the particulars of Luxemburg’s and Jogiches’ lives were 
continuously creating conditions of possibility for border situations to be 
enacted: they were two young Jewish exiles, heavily involved in revolu- 
tionary politics and in disagreement with the party line of the social 
democratic circles in Germany. But in writing to each other from the 
	  	  
	  
margins they were experiencing border situations within which a new 
image of the world was possible. In this light the unbearable heaviness 
of being separated from the beloved was not just a contingency of the 
amorous relationship: while visualizing a diﬀerent world, Luxemburg 
was specifically situating her life within it. Her letters to Jogiches are 
thus creating tangible links between the particular and the universal. In 
reflecting upon the unhappiness of her own life, she was departing from 
the abstractness of political discourse and could thus conceptualize and 
configure a diﬀerent politics of ‘feeling at home in the world’ (Disch, 
1994: 172). Although accepting the fragmentation of the world, through 
her letters Luxemburg was attempting ‘to accommodate the modern 
sense of alienation in the world and the modern desire to create, in a 
world that is no longer a home to us, a human world that could become 
our home’ (Arendt, 1994: 186). 
In doing this Luxemburg was continuously confronted with diﬀerent 
ideas and perspectives: not just those of the social democratic circles she 
was refuting and in which she was acting in concert with Jogiches, but 
also with those of the beloved. Her letters to Jogiches stage a scene of an 
ongoing struggle of ideas and perspectives – not so much about politics 
but mostly about love-in-politics – that would remain open till the very 
end. As Arendt (1968: 45) has poignantly pointed out, it was not jeal- 
ousy, as Nettl has argued, but war, imprisonment, the failure of the 
revolution and their murder that has made the Luxemburg–Jogiches 
relationship ‘one of the great and tragic love stories of  Socialism’ 
(Nettl, cited in Arendt, 1968: 45). 
Thus the ambivalence and openness that mark the discourses, thematic 
preoccupations and forms of epistolary narratives take up particularly 
political meanings in Luxemburg’s letters to Jogiches. On the one hand 
they most forcefully express the potential of epistolary narratives in 
enabling human communication, while revealing its failures and limita- 
tions; on the other hand they rigorously show that it is only in commu- 
nication – with all its limitations and constraints – that a project of 
humanistic politics can ever be realized. In the light of Jaspers’ philoso- 
phy, so influential for Arendt, Luxemburg’s letters become important 
documents carrying traces of existential and political communication at 
work. What I further suggest is that these letters intensify the political 
dimension of Luxemburg’s work rather than obscure it: it is in the inter- 
play between existential appearances and political reflections that human 
beings become most profoundly aware of their freedom and their will to 
fight for it. 
In this context, Luxemburg’s letters expose some of the tensions and 
ambivalences in the conceptualization of love in Arendt’s work as dis- 
cussed in the second section of this article.20 More specifically, they show 
that the statement in The Human Condition that love is an ‘antipolitical 
force’  (Arendt,  1998:  242)  can  create  misunderstandings  if  Arendt’s 
	  	  
	  
notion of love is not read as an existential category or if it is isolated from 
Arendt’s overall political thought as well as her posthumous work The 
Life of the Mind (Arendt, 1981). Herein lies the force of narratives in 
grounding abstractions, operationalizing concepts and reconnecting 
philosophical ideas to politics and life, which was after all what both 
Luxemburg and Arendt strived to do through their life and work. 
Moreover, the intense corporeal elements of Luxemburg’s passionate 
love letters –  ‘I  kiss  you  on  the  mouth  and  on  my  beloved  nose’ 
(6 March 1899, in Ettinger, 1979: 75) – point to the absence of the vis- 
ceral in Arendt’s consideration of love as a force of life and remind us of 
the need for feminist genealogies of Love as Eros to be written 
(Tamboukou, 2010: 146). 
	  
	  
To the Letter: Love in Politics, Politics in Love 
In exploring ‘the content of the form’ of narrative discourse in historical 
thought, White has influentially suggested that ‘narrative, far from being 
merely a form of discourse that can be filled with diﬀerent contents, real 
or imaginary as the case may be, already possesses a content prior to any 
given actualization of it in speech or writing’ (White, 1987: xi). Following 
White’s line of thought around the ‘content of the form’, what I have 
suggested in this article is that Luxemburg’s letters to her lover and 
comrade Jogiches create an interesting archive wherein the epistolary 
form dramatizes and gives specificity to the relationship between politics 
and love. 
Luxemburg’s letters  have been  read as  Arendtian  stories: tangible 
traces of the contingency of action and the unpredictability of the 
human condition, constitutive of politics and of the discourse of 
History. In acting and speaking together, human beings expose them- 
selves to each other, reveal the uniqueness of who they are and, through 
taking the risk of disclosure, they connect with others. In this light, nar- 
ration creates conditions of possibility for uniqueness, plurality and com- 
munication to be enacted within the Arendtian configuration of the 
political. Love as an eﬀect of the journey of memory and as a force of 
life is crucial here: through love we reconnect with the moment of our 
beginning, thus becoming existentially aware of freedom as an inherent 
possibility of the human condition, a principle ‘created when man was 
created but not before’ (Arendt, 1998: 177). 
In opening up paths to the anamnesis of freedom, Luxemburg’s love 
letters to Jogiches created conditions of possibility for existential border 
situations to be enacted and for their life and relationship to be re-ima- 
gined within the horizon of the revolution they were fighting for. For 
their external readers, the force of these passionate letters around love 
and politics illuminate ‘dark times’ in the history of the world and facili- 
tate existential leaps into open and radical futures. 
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Notes 
1. Luxemburg’s life has been the topic of two main biographies and several 
biographical sketches. See, among others, Nettl (1966) and Ettinger (1982). 
2. Clearly there is a long line of philosophical approaches to love and a rich 
body of literature around it, but given the limitations and scope of this 
essay, I will focus on the Augustinian notion of love, or rather Arendt’s 
reading of it. 
3. This essay was written in 1918 without intention of publication. Lenin’s 
response was that ‘ in spite of her mistakes . . . [Luxemburg] was and is an 
eagle’ (Arendt, 1968: 55). 
4. Before her Luxemburg essay, Arendt had published The Human Condition in 
1958 and On Revolution in 1963. 
5. The Spartacus League was an underground political organisation founded 
by Luxemburg and Jogiches, among others, in 1914.  See Nettl (1966), 
Ettinger (1982) and Bronner (1993). 
6. The book was first published in 1957 but it was written much earlier while 
Arendt was still in Germany (first draft 1933) and later in Paris, where 
Benjamin actively encouraged her to complete it around 1938. See Arendt 
(2000: 5, 50). 
7. Young-Bruehl (1982: 135) has suggested that in writing about Jogiches, 
Arendt  was  drawing  Blu¨  cher’s  pen  portrait.  In  her  biography,  
Ettinger (1982: 146–7) has looked into how Luxemburg struggled with  
Jogiches’ affair. Ettinger (1995) was also the first to write about the   
Arendt– Heidegger love affair, mostly drawing on their letters. 
8. In 1893, Luxemburg  and Jogiches founded together  the first influential 
Polish Marxist workers’ party, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of 
Poland (SDKP), which was reorganized in 1900 as the Social Democracy of 
the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL). See Ettinger (1979: 2–3, 
195–6). 
9. For more biographical details about Jogiches, see Ettinger (1982). 
10. Social criticism was an issue even for the revolutionary circles of Zurich and 
Berlin, and Luxemburg often expresses her concern in her letters. 
11. By bracketing Arendt’s relationship with Heidegger and Blu¨  cher, I do 
not want to say that they were not influential in her theoretical 
conceptualiza- tion of love, but that  their  discussion  goes  well  beyond  
the limits of this paper. For interesting insights in Arendt’s worldly love  
relationships, see, among others, Kristeva (2001) and Young-Bruehl 
(1982). See also the Arendt–Blu¨  cher (1996) and the Arendt–Heidegger 
(2004) correspondence. 
	  	  
	  
12. See Honig (1995) for an excellent collection of the debates around Arendt’s 
work in political theory and feminist scholarship. 
13. In explicating Augustine’s notions of love as craving, Arendt (1996: 11–12) 
writes: ‘This fearlessness is what love seeks. Love as craving (appetitus) is 
determined by its goal, and this goal is freedom from fear (metu carere).’ 
14. Augustine’s Confessions, X, 17, 26; X, 8, 14 (in Arendt, 1996: 56). 
15. Augustine’s Confessions, X, 33, 50 (in Arendt, 1996: 57). 
16. See Hammer (2000) for an excellent discussion of the Augustinian journey 
of memory and the way it shapes Arendt’s political thought. 
17. In Ovid’s Heroids, 15 heroines write verse letters to the beloved who has 
deserted them. 
18. See Ahmed (2010) for a feminist critique of happiness. 
19. Given the limitations of this paper, I cannot discuss in detail more letters 
where border situations emerge. Rather than using phrases and extracts from 
a variety of letters, I decided to present and discuss in detail the 6 March 
1899 birthday letter as an encompassing epistolary appearance of important 
themes emerging in Luxemburg’s correspondence. 
20. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer who brought this insight in the 
horizon of this essay. 
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